A debate has been raging regarding the position taken by the different political players on the issue of restoration of the Nov 2 judiciary. However, not enough has been said, at least in the post election period, regarding the overall context of that strategy of which the issue of restoration of judges is just one element.
The principal strategic choices available to the political forces have been labeled transition and transformation. The strategic choices being made clearly point towards a strategy of transition. These choices include acceptance of Musharraf, continuation of attorney general Qayyum, crafting of a new role for Durrani (Pak ambassador in the US), a strong desire to retain the post Nov 3 judges, amendments aimed at positioning Dogar for a second stint as CJ etc. These steps have been reciprocated by the establishment with the NRO being only the most high profile of these reciprocal gestures.
What the strategy of a negotiated transition has achieved is expansion of the political space for democratic forces. This included the doffing of the uniform, non involvement of the agencies in the electoral process, withdrawal of the army from civilian institutions etc. As a result the democratic forces have a majority in the parliament and hold the office of prime minister and cabinet positions. Seemingly the democratic forces are in the ascendancy and the influence of establishment curtailed. All of this made possible by the negotiations between Benazir Bhutto and the Musharraf led establishment with these negotiations brokered and in a way performance guaranteed by the Americans. BB used the backdrop of the lawyers, media,civil society movement against the General to leverage her negotiating position both with the Americans and Musharraf.
So if this strategy has achieved all of this in such a short period of time isn’t it worth sacrificing a few pristine principles regarding the issue of the restoration of the judiciary to keep the transition strategy going? That is the principal question facing us today but nobody is willing to ask let alone answer.
For me the strategy is wrong on two counts. One is the process used and the second is the long term impact of the strategy. In terms of process the lack of transparency of the negotiations is a critical factor. It is the result of this lack of transparency that people are suspicious of conflicts of interest having come into play in these negotiations with the NRO being mentioned repeatedly as evidence of this conflict of interest. The second aspect is the complete lack of any clear markers of how the progress and success of this transition will be measured.
However, the most important aspect is the long term impact of this transition strategy. After all didn’t we see the same transition strategy in action in 1988 after Zia’s death? And didn’t we hear the same arguments in its favour? How successful did that strategy turn out to be? Pakistan is a poor country with weak institutions, wide spread poverty and an ambitious establishment. As they say “soney par sohaga” is the current global commodity crises which is creating the worst global inflationary environment since the 70’s. All of this means that the popularity of any govt can erode very fast. Would the establishment attempt once again to regain its absolute control if such an opportunity arises? Would they work pro actively to engineer such a situation as they have done in the past? After all the behavior of the establishment in the 90’s was not because the political forces had refused to “show maturity” or confront the establishment by stripping it of its undue powers and hold them accountable for their transgressions.
My fear is that we are repeating a historic mistake. The driving force for this strategy is of very little interest to me. Whether, it is personal greed for power and pelf or a poor read of historical lessons, the results are going to be identical. I hope of course that I am wrong in my analysis and fears.
__________________________________________[Courtesy http://www.teeth.com.pk/blog/2008/05/05/is-2008-another-1988#more-2024]
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